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 The study attempts to understand the financial effects of performance enhancing corporate 
culture in Japanese companies, as well as the differences between performance enhancing corporate 
culture and Japanese corporate culture. The study utilizes a combination of case studies and qualitative 
research to compare and analyze the seven-year growth rate average of revenue, net-income, stock 
price, and employee number before performance enhancing corporate culture implementation year and 
seven years after. The case studies are narrowed down by Japanese companies who satisfy at least two 
of the identified corporate culture traits from both sides.  
 The study found that performance enhancing corporate culture failed to significantly increase 
the average yearly growth rate of revenue, net-income, and employee number in seven years in 
comparison to the average yearly growth rate before implementation year. However, in all cases, the 
seven-year average growth rate of stock price experienced growth. Companies were able to attract 
more investors with the effort to implement change in corporate culture. The qualitative research also 
suggests that Japanese companies with Japanese corporate culture may require more time to realize 
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the financial benefit of performance enhancing corporate culture because of the contrast between the 
two culture. The corporate culture shift also brought forth more consolidation that led to the companies 
cutting losses with profitable and non-profitable businesses to adapt to the changing external 
environment. 
 The findings may help set expectations for Japanese companies on the adaptation of 
performance enhancing corporate culture as well as encourage them to welcome change in the rapidly 
evolving globalized world in order to materialize the financial benefit faster than domestic and 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1. THE BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 Companies can achieve long-term sustainable growth with performance enhancing corporate 
culture that pushes the envelope with challenging the status quote, working for the employee, 
customers, and stockholders, and offering opportunities to train leadership. As the world changes 
faster and faster due to many factors such as globalization and climate change, corporate culture that 
encourages people to play the devil’s advocate and challenge traditions can help companies forge new 
paths that lead to new solutions while achieving lasting success.  
 Many previous researches of corporate culture have been studied in several aspects; for 
example, correlation between corporate culture and financial performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992), 
characteristics of high-performing organizations (Kim & Bang, 2013), or Japanese business culture 
(Nishiyama, 2000). However, it seems that none of the past researches examined the financial effects 
of performance enhancing corporate culture in companies outside of the United States and United 
Kingdom. Therefore, the study intends to further expand the knowledge in this area, focusing on 
Japanese companies and Japanese corporate culture.  
Section 2. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 This study will attempt to examine the financial effects of performance enhancing corporate 
culture in Japanese companies as well as analyze typical Japanese corporate culture to understand the 
difference between the two sets of culture. By observing interviews and frameworks from previous 
studies, company press releases, annual reports, and public financial data, the research will examine 
the growth rate of financial metrics and the relationships between financial growth and events before 
and after the companies implement performance enhancing culture over a fourteen-year period. 
 The in-depth analysis of corporate culture and financial performance aims to shed light for 
Japanese companies on the financial effects of incorporating performance enhancing corporate culture. 
Moreover, the study of typical Japanese corporate culture and performance enhancing corporate 
culture and their influence on employee behavior will offer insight on the correlation between 
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corporate culture and financial performance. 
Section 3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 The significance of the study can be described in several ways; 
1. The study will provide insight on the financial effects of performance enhancing corporate 
culture in Japanese corporate culture settings. 
2. The study will inform the major differences between the two set of corporate culture. 
3. The study will identify the steps to create and maintain performance enhancing corporate 
culture. 
4. The study will help companies operating with Japanese like corporate culture better 
understand the implications of adapting performance enhancing corporate culture. 
Section 4. TERM DEFINITION 
Performance Enhancing Corporate Culture: A set of corporate culture that generates high financial 
performance with a work environment that encourages employees to embrace adaptability, equal 
dedication to the three managerial constituencies (customer, employee, stockholders), and 
commitment to leadership development on all levels.  
Japanese Corporate Culture: A set of corporate culture more commonly found in Japanese 
companies that create stable businesses with a work environment that encourages group consensus to 
minimize risk while maintaining harmony. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Researchers have concluded that a Japanese firm with typical Japanese corporate culture has 
the following traits: slow but steady decision-making speed, compliance with authority, and risk-
aversive attitude. Japanese corporate culture focuses on achieving consensus on every layer of the 
hierarchy to maximize group success and minimize financial risks on every decision. Many Japanese 
business culture stresses the mantra that is “Ho-Ren-So”, which is an abbreviation for “Hokoku” (to 
report), “Renraku” (to inform) and “Sodan” (to consult); this mantra ensures that every employee 
report on a process or result to their superiors before a decision can be made by their superior 
(Zivanovic, 2018).  
On the other hand, many academics have conducted researches on the topic of corporate 
culture; however, the three fundamental organizational culture that help propel a firm’s financial 
performance are adaptative ability, the three managerial constituencies, and leadership development 
engagement. Companies that encourages and promotes these traits tend to possess managers that pay 
close attention to relevant changes and initiate incremental adjustments to adapt to the external 
environment (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Moreover, the behavioral norms also drive employees to meet 
the legitimate needs of the three key constituencies that helps excel the organization: customers, 
employees, and stockholders. Furthermore, these values that emphasize the importance of adaptability 
push every employee throughout the management hierarchy to identify, train, and promote those with 
promising leadership qualities to sustain the corporate culture. The goal of this literature review is to 
both examine the three distinctive Japanese corporate culture and analyze the three corporate culture 
that boost financial performance.  
Section 1. JAPANESE CORPORATE CULTURE: DECISION-MAKING SPEED 
Consistency is a big part of Japanese corporate culture. Due to the Japanese cultural focus on 
group affiliations and harmony, business decisions and proposals are approved at a much slower rate 
compared to other countries with Western corporate culture. Many Japanese abhor taking personal 
risks to expedite the decision-making process in order to avoid disrupting the group affiliations and 
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harmony. Moreover, with the sense of identity anchored to the group, Japanese nationals suppress 
their desire to be different and conform to the group in order to avoid being rejected (Nishiyama, 2000). 
Lastly, Japanese flourished in a vertical society for centuries that conditioned people to acquiesce to 
pressures from authority (Nishiyama, 2000); defiance to authority led to official or “unofficial” 
punishments. The combination of these cultural factors shaped Japanese firms into meticulous, careful, 
steady, and well-oiled machines that have some of the world’s longest living companies. 
1.1.1. Group Affiliations 
From a young age, Japanese people had been taught to always visualize themselves primarily 
in their relationship with the group. Their self-identities mattered little since they were defined by their 
family, relatives, schools, workplace, and society as a whole (Nishiyama, 2000). They are required to 
adhere to a specific role according to the prescribed social and occupational positions. The group-
oriented society programs everyone to affiliate with communities in order to attain social identity, 
support, and protection. Likewise, employees generally choose conformity rather than defiance 
whenever they are forced to make individual choices; they also refrain from expressing disagreement 
with whatever appears to be the majority view. This self-restraint is called enryo, which is considered 
an important social virtue frequently displayed in social interactions by the Japanese (Nishiyama 2000). 
One example that perfectly demonstrates the Japanese cultural emphasis on group affiliation is the 
office setup. With rows of small desks facing each other without any partitions, employees work as a 
unit and can voluntary or involuntary share information up and down the row. A section chief, sitting 
at the end of the rows of desks, monitors day-to-day business activities and may even offer to assist 
subordinates.  
The recruitment process represents another example of group mentality focus in Japanese 
companies. Many chief executives of major Japanese companies frequently describe the firm as a 
“family” (Hatvany and Pucik, 1981). With the commitment to “family”, firms practice lifetime 
employment that results in extra scrutiny during university graduate recruitment. Almost all Japanese 
companies administer a series of written examinations and interviews designed to assess the candidates’ 
general intelligence, motivation to work, personality, mental and physical health, and family 
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background (Nishiyama, 2000). Of all the assessments, technical knowledge and work experience 
comes in second. The most important indicators of qualifications are excellent formal education, 
amicable personality, good family upbringing, and high motivation to work as a group member 
(Nishiyama, 2000). As long as the candidate’s personality and background fit the company corporate 
culture, work qualification and knowledge stand to be inconsequential. 
1.1.2. Harmony 
 Harmony, also known as wa, is one of the most important Japanese cultural values. Japanese 
people believe that harmonious interpersonal relationships should be maintained at all costs. Through 
actively avoiding aggressive or disruptive attitudes in public, Japanese people can minimize 
interpersonal conflicts or confrontations that embarrasses them (Nishiyama, 2000). Throughout 
childhood, Japanese have been taught to hold back what they really want to say for the sake of 
maintaining interpersonal harmony. As a result, being overly logical or rikutsu-poi is looked down 
upon and even negatively affects a speaker’s reputation, integrity, and trustworthiness. In Japan, 
people carry a conversation by giving each other aizuchi or “agreeable responses” that makes the 
conversation go smoothly. These responses are hai (yes), ee (yes: informal), haa (yes: formal), sō 
(that’s right), sō-da (that’s it, that’s it exactly), and naruhodo nee (indeed) (Nishiyama, 2000). 
 In the working environment, employees actively try to save each other’s “face” in face-to-
face encounters; common communications tactics include “anticipatory communication,” “self-
communication,” “understatement,” and “acting as delegate.” A speaker that uses “anticipatory 
communication” expects the listener or the third party to anticipate his or her wishes without 
submitting a request to spare the embarrassment of asking. In “self-communication,” the speaker will 
mumble something to him or herself, expecting others nearby to hear and act upon; this gives the 
speaker and listener room to operate and decide whether to acknowledge and fulfill the request or 
pretend nothing happened (Nishiyama, 2000). With “understatement,” the speaker pauses in an open-
ended sentence to gauge at the listener’s reactions before finishing accordingly. This communication 
method works well in the Japanese language because syntactically it is not necessary to state the 
subject and the verb of negation or affirmation comes at the end of a sentence (Nishiyama, 2000). In 
13 
“acting as delegate”, the speaker conveys his or her own messages as being of someone else. For 
example, the speaker can say, “I personally don’t care, but my supervisor will never allow this,” when 
his or her supervisor is not concerned about the issue at all (Nishiyama, 2000). The practice of vague 
and indirect communication methods decreases tension among peers and bosses; sometimes the 
listener might even pretend not to hear the question if is difficult or embarrassing to answer.  
 Harmony also plays a role in communications between subordinates and managers. A 
subordinate is always reluctant to speak up in fear of causing loss of face or disrupting interpersonal 
harmony by making “foolish statements.” Moreover, even when statements are made with caution and 
humility, constructive criticisms, frank opinions, and disagreements are often taken as personal attacks 
or insults by managers and subordinates alike (Nishiyama, 2000). Most of the time, Japanese people 
prefer to solve issues through behind the scene small talks over tea or coffee breaks. During these 
informal meetings, discussions move back and forth between the issues at hand and agreeable topics 
to ease tension and achieve the goal of arriving at an agreement on the solution. 
Business decisions in Japan travel a long way up and must go through many adjustments 
before a presentation can be held to acquire consensus on the solution and decision. In the end, the top 
management will select a carefully thought-out plan that minimizes error and brings consistency on 
every level (Hashimoto, 2019). Furthermore, staff members will always try to follow preplanned 
standard operating procedures to maintain organizational consistency and avoid process mishap. 
Workers in this type of environment takes time to gather and analyze data before making a decision. 
Section 2. JAPANESE CORPORATE CULTURE: COMPLIANCE WITH AUTHORITY 
Following authority has been ingrained in the Japanese society ever since the feudal days of 
the Tokugawa era where farmers and commoners had to unconditionally obey the samurai lords 
because defiance meant instant death (Nishiyama, 2000). The lack of viable agricultural land, 15% of 
the whole nation, only reinforced the farmers and commoners to work together and obey the samurai 
lord in order to survive in the harsh environment (Das, 2013). Moreover, the vertical structured society 
modeled after the traditional teaching of Confucius created a country that emphasizes interpersonal 
relationships and adherence to authority built upon ranks and status based on sex, age, rank, and 
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occupation. Japanese people tend to have a strong desire to know each other’s relative social status by 
age, time of graduation, the year of entering a company, and the rank of institutions with which a 
person is affiliated during the first meeting (Nishiyama, 2000). This helps establish the ranks along a 
vertical social scale and determines how to properly interact with the counterpart because the speaker 
must respect someone above him or herself in the status ladder. Because of the focus on ranks in the 
social scale, the Japanese language, subsequently, progressed along with society and into a highly 
status-oriented language with several different levels of politeness. A simple greeting such as “Good 
morning” can be said in at least three different ways and choosing the wrong form to greet someone 
positioned above or below the speaker can become a cause of embarrassment and displeasure 
(Nishiyama, 2000).  
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 and again after Japan’s defeat in World War II only reinforced 
the idea that authority always looks out for the subjects’ best interest. The Japanese government, in 
both events, successfully catapulted Japan forward towards a fast recovery and exponential growth. 
Following the World War II, Japan became the second largest economy in the world with total control 
from bureaucrats and government that guided industries in rebuilding the nation. Till this day, 
authority bodies such as the government bureaucrats and schools still retain their traditional power 
over the daily lives of Japanese citizens (Nishiyama, 2000).  
1.2.1. Vertical Structured Society 
 The teachings of Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism solidified itself in the Japanese society 
after Japan’s ill-advised invasion of Korea in the 1590s that saw an influx of books and scholars versed 
in Neo-Confucianism. A philosopher and writer by the name of Hayashi Razan further developed his 
teacher’s studies and popularized Neo-Confucianism in Japan. Attracted by his work, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu appointed Razan as the chief scholar of the Tokugawa shogunate that lasted four shoguns 
(Tsutsui,2007). As a result, the Tokugawa shogunate adopted Neo-Confucianism, on top of the 
teachings of classical Confucianism, as the principle ruling philosophy and ideology for the nation for 
over two and a half centuries. Due to the 220-year isolationist policy during the Tokugawa shogunate, 
Japan developed its own unique culture and, to this day, continues to live by some of the Neo-
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Confucianism teachings like harmony and loyalty. 
 Classical Confucianism teachings established the backbone of the vertically structured 
Japanese society. Kasulis (1998) noted: 
[Classical] Confucianism gave Japan a hierarchical model for social and political order. It 
focused on personal interaction, explaining the responsibilities and duties relevant to the five 
basic dyadic relations: master–servant, parent–child, husband–wife, elder sibling–younger 
sibling and friend–friend. When the dyadic relationships are hierarchical, the person in the 
superior position is to care for the person in the lower and the person in the lower position is 
to be loyal to the superior. (para. 3). 
The philosophy stressed the practice of proper forms of conduct, especially in social and familial 
relationships; every person was to act according to his or her status to create a harmoniously 
functioning society and ensure loyalty to the state and authority based on the teachings of filial piety 
(Dolan & Worden, 1992). On top of Confucianism teachings, Neo-Confucianism added the idea that 
family stability and social responsibility are human obligations (Dolan & Worden, 1992). Every 
citizen has the responsibility to maintain stability on a daily basis. 
 Modern day Japan, even with Confucianism removed from the school curriculum, remains a 
vertical structured society with strong emphasis on status and obedience to authority. The concept of 
senpai (senior) and kohai (junior) remains prevalent throughout all life stages. Differentiated by the 
slightest difference in age, graduation time, the time of entry into a company, and so on, Senpai is 
expected to take care of kohai, and in turn, kohai must respect senpai and be willing to do anything 
for him or her (Nishiyama, 2000). At work, many executives and managers who have achieved the 
same rank remain hesitant to act as equals because previous sempai-kōhai (senior-junior) relationships 
can never be forgotten (Nishiyama, 2000). Even when a junior member holds a position above the 
senior member, he or she must show respect, remain courteous, and avoid arguments when 
communicating to the senior who is older in age or holds a higher status. During business meetings, 
the seating arrangement also embodies the hierarchical structure or status relationships of all members 
present. The highest-ranking person sits at the head of the conference table; those of lower status sit 
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away from him or her in a descending order; it is an unforgivable violation of the protocol to switch 
seats just for one’s own convenience because each seat represents a different degree of respect towards 
the person who occupies it (Nishiyama, 2000). Knowing their rank relative to other participants, each 
executive and staff member gives up their seats to a higher-ranked person coming in later and moves 
down to a lower seat to avoid violation of the vertical structure that leads to uneasiness and discomfort 
during the meeting (Nishiyama, 2000). 
1.2.2. Japanese Language 
 Developed alongside Japanese society, the Japanese language includes the feature of status-
oriented speech that exists in three honorific forms: respectful language (sonkeigo), humble language 
(kenjōgo), and polite language (teineigo). If the speaker sits lower on the social status compared to the 
listener, the speaker must use respectful language when addressing the listener. The simple word “you” 
in Japanese has several different expressions: sochira, otoku, anata, kimi, omae, and teme in order of 
politeness. As a result, Japanese people tend to be straight forward during the first meet up by asking 
more personal questions in order to establish social status differences and infer the proper 
communication manner going forward. 
 Both the respectful and humble honorific language, known as referent honorifics, are used in 
situations where the speaker addresses someone above them in the social status and never used to 
describe the speaker. The polite honorific language, on the other hand, can be used in any situations 
as well as the speaker’s own actions. In the business world, the customer or client sits at the top of the 
hierarchy and must be addressed with the respectful and humble honorific language. Between 
colleagues, people tend to stick to honorific language until the corporate hierarchy becomes more 
evident; however, honorific language is always used when addressing someone older, ignoring job 
position ranking completely. The language not only effects group discussion dynamics but also 
business efficiency. 
Deep-seated in the social structure and language, the pressure to comply to authority starts as 
early as the schooling years. If a disgruntled parent openly protests a school authority’s handling of 
his son, the school will make it extremely unpleasant for the son to stay on (Nishiyama, 2000). All of 
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a sudden, the child may lose all his good friends and teachers’ support, no matter how legitimate the 
parent’s complaint might have been because he, along with his parents, were not team players. The 
consequences of defying school authority may even lead to bullying or ijime of the child from 
classmates and even teachers (Nishiyama, 2000). Similar stories occur in the business world, if an 
employee openly questions and disregards a manager, even with good intentions, he or she may be 
placed on the backburner for promotion because he or she failed to work as a team player.  
Consequently, employees feel intimidated to ask questions considering they may be recognized as 
confrontational to managers’ proposals or ideas. Authoritative organizations put more emphasis on 
the importance of politeness and not openly discussing opinions, disagreements, or pointing out flaws 
(Stone, 2019); the group is sacred and leaders are seen as benevolent (Merchant, 2018). The structure 
also cultivates managers that will rarely scold their staff in front of others, and any suggestions or 
inputs will likely be made with subtle inferences and non-verbal clues (Stone, 2019). At the same time, 
managers often consider themselves a secondary father figures to their team members because of the 
long-term personal and professional relationships built over company activities (Stone, 2019). 
Section 3. JAPANESE CORPORATE CULTURE: RISK-ADVERSE 
 Reporting a record high ¥506.4 trillion in cash collectively in 2019, companies listed in Japan, 
tend to operate more conservatively. The consequences of failure stand as the main deterrent of taking 
risk. In the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey, just 3.8% of adults 18-64 are engaged in 
starting a firm, compared to 5.3% in Germany, and a 24-country average of 8% (Katz, 2016). A 
combination of societal structure and pressure mentioned in the previous sections created many risk-
controlling and consensus forming corporate mechanisms like the plan proposal (ringisho). The focus 
on group success creates the incessant need for consensus on business decisions which in turn, helps 
minimize risks. In addition, with promotions based on seniority and time input, employees are 
conditioned to avoid taking risky moves. 
 To initiate a proposal, an employee must go through a long process to draft the ringisho 
(proposal). Before drafting, the plan initiator in charge must meet face-to-face and discuss the general 
idea with key executives, managers, and supervisors in informal, behind-the-scene meetings, so called 
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nemawashi; which literally means “twisting the tree roots around” (Nishiyama, 2000). Nemawashi is 
best described as a lobbying mechanism to unofficially test the responses to an idea without exposing 
or endangering anyone before making a commitment (Nishiyama, 2000). Every proposal requires 
nemawashi to move through the system. After informally getting everyone on the same page, the plan 
initiator must now collect signatures of every supervisor, middle management, and top management 
in the relevant departments on the final version of the proposal. Ringisho is used in Japan because  
a Japanese will not run the risk of taking over the responsibility and making independent 
decisions. The function of a Japanese leader is that of a “mediator” or of a “harmonizing 
agent.” Since the responsibility does not rest on any one person, but in the group, there is no 
delegation or line of authority. Distribution of authority and responsibility is also made 
according to the seniority and chronological age of executives. Therefore, senior members 
tend to assume more important roles and positions, although they may not necessarily be the 
most capable members. (Nishiyama, 2000, p. 118) 
Even though the whole process may take a considerable amount of time, most Japanese businesses 
consider ringisho the best way to minimize risk and incorporate everyone in the decision-making 
process.  
In Japanese society, immersing oneself in work exemplifies masculinity and “working hard” 
and “not giving up” are regarded as virtues (Ono, 2018). Accordingly, employees that spend more 
time working are recognized as hard workers and rewarded with a promotion based on seniority. Japan 
is an input-oriented society where wages rise automatically in accordance with years of service, 
disregarding output and performance (Ono, 2018). As a result, just because an employee delivers good 
performance does not correlate to increase in salary or early promotion. However, committing just one 
mistake may derail an employee’s career because failure determines a person’s fitness at work (Kopp, 
2012). As a consequence, teams hold plenty of face-to-face meetings for progress update and plan 
recapitulation to make sure everyone is on the same page (Hashimoto, 2019). Employees refrain from 
proposing ideas or solutions while taking time to accept tasks before careful analysis on risk level 
since minimizing risks guarantees a ride to higher positions on the “escalator” system of seniority. 
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In Japanese organizations, even if the result of a risky decision turns out well, employees 
more than likely will not receive a bonus but invite damaging jealousy from peers (Kopp, 2012). With 
group mentality ingrained in the culture, the nail that sticks out gets hammered down; group success 
comes first above all else. Once someone fails at work, not only does he or she loses face but also the 
potential for an early promotion or raise.  
Section 4. PERFORMANCE ENHANCING CULTURE: ADAPTATIVE ABILITY 
 A set of values and practices shared across all groups in a grim, Corporate culture is usually 
formed when a group of employees interact over a significant period of time while achieving relative 
successful business performances time and again at whatever they undertake (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). 
The repeated approach that leads to solutions which generate success overtime contritubes to the 
reinforcement of the work method. In turn, the approach method becomes a part of the corporate 
culture. Kotter and Heskett, by gathering data on 207 companies from twenty-two different U.S. 
industries, found that firms who actively anticipated disruptions and adopted new strategies when 
needed 
with cultures that emphasized all the key managerial constituencies (customers, stockholders, 
and employees) and leadership from managers at all levels outperformed firms that did not 
have those cultural traits by a huge margin (see Table 1 below). (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 
11)  
Table 1: The Economics and Social Costs of Low-Performance Cultures (1977-1988) 
 
Source: Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 78 
Corporate culture change towards adaptability often originates around a small group of people, most 
of the time just one person, that commit themselves to the new direction and vision through 
challenging the status quo. At the same time, these leaders try to energize key personnel that can 
Average for Twelve 
Firms with Performance-
Enhancing Cultures (%)
Average for Twenty Firms 
without Performance-
Enhancing Cultures (%)
Revenue Growth 682 166
Employment Growth 282 36
Stock Price Growth 901 74
Tax Base (Net Income) Growth 756 1
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amplify the need for cultural change through the perception of looming crisis and create pockets of 
support within their own domain. The leaders often become the living embodiments of the adaptative 
culture they desire to attain critical credibility to their words (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). On average, 
companies that initiate a culture shift invest about six and a half years to complete (see Appendix A 
for data). Once the new adaptability culture begins to settle in as the norm after a combination of non-
micromanagement style, cheerleading, and initiative recognition, these leaders initiate systems that 
continuously promote the value on all levels. Companies that promote and practice adaptative 
corporate culture not only financially outperforms competitors but also sustain good performance for 
the long-haul (see Appendix B for flowchart of how companies develop and preserve adaptative 
culture). As competition, technology, and consumers all evolve at a faster pace, companies can commit 
and breakdown obsolete culture deep-rooted by past achievements. 
People working in adaptative companies entail a risk-taking, trusting, and proactive approach 
to organizational life; members believe that, without a doubt, they can effectively manage whatever 
new problems and opportunities that come their way because the organization is not afraid of 
suggestions to change (Kilmann, Saxton, Serpa, 1990). If a problem does arise, team members can 
meet with the manager and pitch thought out solutions within the preset boundaries and constraints 
after outlining the problem. Teams and individuals are encouraged to make mistakes going too fast 
even it means losing money, all for the sake of learning from mistakes. With widespread enthusiasm 
to do whatever it takes to achieve organizational success, workers strive to stay adaptative. Managers 
in these companies consistantly pay close attention to relevant changes in the firm’s context and the 
initiate incremental changes in strategies and practices to keep firms and culture in line with 
environmental realities (Kotter & Heskett, 1992).  
These behaviors are the by-product of autonomy within established boundaries and 
constraints on what is allowed; workers hold more responsibility for operational decission making and 
performance improvement (Kim & Bang, 2013). These companies foster an atmosphere that promotes 
freedom for individuals to express their diverse opinions and openly question and challenge decisions. 
Moreover, the environment encourages information transparency that guarantees the opportunity for 
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people to be heard; this not only welcomes open and honest debates but also creates an information 
ethos in which errors are reported without fear (Kim & Bang, 2013). In times of smooth sailing, the 
companies anticipate ahead for potential industry shift while habitually keeping the organizational 
culture on edge towards entrepreneurship to sustain agility.  
To maintain an adaptative culture, Sir John Harvey-Jones, the Chairman of Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) from 1982 to 1987, offered his opinion after he successfully reshaped the ICI’s 
corporate culture and led the company to a pretax profit of £1 billion in 1984, four years removed from 
a loss of £16 million: 
The start of everything is to locate, as honestly as one can, the position of one’s company and 
where the current trends will take one. That in itself is bound to reveal a number of outcomes 
consequent on pursuing present policies which are very different from those one would like. 
A considerable amount of scanning of the outside world, both the competitors in an individual 
business sense and the external environment in a broader sense, is then necessary. Then the 
development of broad-scale corporate dreams must be carried out by the board. These have 
to be married with the individual dreams of each business who, in addition to achieving the 
best they can ask for their business, have to perform and deliver what the board has asked of 
them for the company as a whole…It is far more important to be moving forward in broadly 
the right direction than to be stuck still without businesses going anywhere. (Kotter & Heskett, 
1992, p.115) 
Management on all level must be adamant with the core adaptive values but flexible to other practices 
and values. This discipline requires pushing hard to win, but not allowing the pride that comes with 
success to develop into arrogance as well as strong but not strangling leadership (Kotter & Heskett, 
1992). For example, young companies that have become highly successful early on usually have 
performance enhancing culture necessary for success in competitive business environemnt; however, 
some fail to adapt to the changing environment because time and success and other factors have blurred 
their memories about they were successful in the first place (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). The distinction 
between core values and behaviors that aid adaptation from specific practices needed to perform then 
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and there are often noted in all writte statements about culture and in all internal training courses 
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992). These course of actions reassure that established efficient mehods that no 
longer fit with the context can easily be discarded without resistance.  
1.4.1. Companies that Lack Adaptative Corporate Culture 
Companies without adaptative culture thrived at one point in time when the culture meshed 
with the context; however, the fit eroded often as a result of changes to which firms had not adapted 
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Many prominent companies that performend well with strong market 
positions in slowly changing environemnts during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s failed to sustain the 
success when the respective industries became more competitive and faster moving. Many of these 
companies had developed change-resistant culture and bad habits over the golden days. For example, 
the ongoing power structure, supported by the current interdependent culture, may resist change 
because it threatens the privilege of those in favorable positions.  
Leaders and management in these firms actively install control points to make sure the culture 
and methods that brought success in the past can be persevere. With corporate focus shifting away 
from innovation to control, managers working in these firms are often somewhat arrogant, narrow-
minded, and bureaucratic in a value system that cares more about self-interest than about customers, 
stockholders, employees, or good leadership (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). The system not only makes it 
difficult for anyone to propose new startegies and practices but also pushes away individuals that want 
what’s best for the company and colleagues. People become more reactive, risk averse, and uncreative 
the longer they work within the system of control; information can no longer flow quickly and easily 
through the organization. In the end, the corporate culture begins to behave like mattresses or sofas 
with inner springs that change shape with application of sufficient force, but as son as the force is 
removed or lesssend the original shape returns (Kotter & Heskett, 1992).  
In a company with adaptative corporate culture, superiors generally give some great leeway 
to subordinates so that they can decide and make decisions quickly (Hashimoto, 2019). On top of that, 
the managers establish boundaries and constraints to empower people to let them feel like owners 
(Kim & Bang, 2013). As a result, employees often work day-to-day expecting little supervision. 
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Companies that encompass this corporate culture tend to value responsibility for operational decision 
making and performance improvement to individuals and work teams (Kim & Bang, 2013). 
Section 5. PERFORMANCE ENHANCING CULTURE: THE THREE MANAGERIAL 
CONSTITUENCIES 
 Having just an adaptative culture is not enough to sustain business, companies must also 
deeply care about all three constituencies: customers, employees, and stockholders. In Kotter & 
Heskett’s research, the high performers all had a similar value system that highly valued all three 
constituencies with variying emphasis. In adddition, these company commited daily operation to the 
phrase “fairness to all” because it guided everyone to “doing the right thing,” (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). 
The shared ideology not only cultivated an atmosphere that fostered an ‘all for one, one for all’ 
mentality but also elminated office politics through the establishment of true meritocracy (Kim & 
Bang, 2013). By focusing on these three values, managers and employees alike can create and 
implement strategies that surround the needs of the constituencies; satisfied and encouraged 
employees can perform better and produce products and services that customers really want while 
using financial assets wisely (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Over time as these actions repeat themselves 
over and over again, the organizations can grow and widen gross margins and in turn, increase net 
income and market value.  
Companies that concentrate on fulfilling the needs of the three constituencies often times have 
people that consistently challenge the status quo with very basic questions: Is this what customers 
really need and want? Is this the most efficient or productive way to deliver these products and services 
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992)? Mid and lower-level management in these companies are not afraid to 
propose initiatives to tweak strategies at the first sign of environment change because upper-level 
management usually supports them uncondintionally due to the fact that everyone shares the same 
values. Hewlett-Packard Company serves as a classical example of a firm that flourished because of 
its corporate culture that valued serving all stakeholders. Founders Bill Hewlett and David Packard 
developed a management style, later known as the “HP way,” that  
stressed serving everyone who had a stake in the business with integrity and fairness. The HP 
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way meant that the firm shared its success with its employees, recognizing their individual 
achievements, offering them opportunities to upgrade their skills and abilities, and always 
showing them trust and respect. The HP way meant providing the firm’s customers products 
and services of the greatest value, usually unique or technically superior products, and being 
genuinely interested in arriving at effective solutions to their problems. The HP way also 
meant serving the firm’s stockholders by making profit a high priority and not getting into 
businesses where HP could not make a profitable contribution. For society in general, it meant 
being a very good corporate citizen. (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 60) 
As a result, HP’s high performance lasted over twenty years where net income increased 107 times 
during that period. Moreover, the market value of the firm increased 5.6 times between 1957 and 1967 
while return on invested capital averaged over fifteen percent (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). George 
Newman, HP treasurer for over twenty years until 1993, gave an insight on why he thought HP’s 
corporate culture and the HP Way worked: 
“[Hewlett and Packard’s objectives] weren’t very specific. Instead they represented more of 
a general philosophy of how to be successful—a timeless philosophy that talks about the value 
of profit, satisfied customers, a good environment for employees, and the like. I think our 
collective commitment to those principles has helped us adapt to a changing world much more 
successfully than firms that have, as core values, such things as maintain an AA bond rating. 
I think it also helps that our culture encourages people to step up to the plate. It 
encourages us to have a radical idea every once in a while. That helps to keep us from getting 
too set in our ways.” (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 64) 
By incorporating a corporate culture that stressed the importance of meeting the needs of all 
stakeholders, the two examples illustrated the long-term effects of a timeless management philosophy. 
1.5.1. Companies that Lack Focus on the Three Managerial Constituencies 
 Many of the lower performers also have similar corporate value statements compared to the 
high performers; however, fewer key constituencies are included. Based on Kotter & Heskett’s 
interviews, these statements seemed artificial as though they were the product of a single individual 
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or a single meeting, and not the real priorities of most managers that cared more about their own 
careers, perks, or specific products and technologies (Kotter & Hesskett, 1992). Without the focus on 
customers, employees, and stockholders; management may ignore relevant information and cling to 
outdated practices just because they fear and resist oppositions as well as change proposals. 
Management may simply not risk the firm’s acceptable performance as a way to stay in power. 
 Companies like General Motors (GM) and Sears illustrate how a lack of recognition on what 
is important to the corporate performance can bring a company to its knees. GM, around the 1980s, 
had allowed the financial executives to make key design, productin, and marketing decisions because 
management had placed a great value on economies of scale. This led to the company ignoring other 
important factors such as customer preferences. What the management highly valued demonstrated 
that they assumed the automobile industry operated under relatively stable and predictable climate 
which was far from the truth. Moreover, GM’s propensity toward adversarial labor relations also cost 
the firm a lot of money (Kottery & Heskett, 1992). GM not only failed to identify key product 
preference shifts but also butchered employee relations. To this day, GM continues to struggle with 
public image, profitability, and employee relations. Likewise, Sears developed a corporate culture 
resistance to neede change because of the autonomous fiefdoms inside the firm due to 
“decentralization” (Kotter & Heskett,  1992). Consequently, Sears managers often made decisions 
based on purely internal data while ignoring competition and shifts in consumer preferences. The 
practice persisted over the years and in 2018, Sears filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Even though the 
firm successfully survived by shrinking operating stores, the company continues to stuggle to this day. 
Corporations that have incorporated the performance enhancing culture that underline the 
importance to satisfy the needs of the three constituency outperforms the ones without. Due to the 
corporate direction, people react more honestly, ask questions more frequently, and are more 
spontaneous with their comments and ideas (Reid & Hubbell 2005). When everyone’s opinion is valid 
and welcomed, potential issues get flagged early regardless of the status of the person raising the point 
(Stone, 2019). To sum up, nothing is sacred on the road to fulfilling the needs of the customers, 
employeess, and stockholders. 
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Section 6. PERFORMANCE ENHANCING CULTURE: LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
ENCOURAGEMENT 
 Empowering employees by offering opportunities to lead represents the last piece of the 
performance enhancing culture. By giving autonomy and responsibility for operational decision 
making, management can help employees develop their logical thinking as well as people skills with 
guidance from superiors when needed. Employees posted on the frontline, such as retail stores, usually 
have direct and first-hand experience with customers, one of the three managerial constituencies. 
Because the company encourages leadership development on all levels, these frontline workers that 
understand the market demand can freely propose changes. The culture promotes fast response time 
to any kind of external changes that the frontline workers encounter. 
 Leadership development encouragement stands as an essential corporate culture because of 
one important factor: retirement. Every employee, in time, retires due to different reasons: old age, 
family, personal dream you name it. When workers in management positions retire, someone must fill 
the void left behind. With leadership development encouragement, this someone can step in and take 
up the mantle with years of experience delivering proposals and making team decisions under stress. 
Moreover, this culture helps companies cope with internal organizational challenges of identifying, 
training, and assigning employees to management positions by creating a track record of leadership 
involvement on everyone. 
Researchers have concluded that the three-performance enhancing corporate culture are the 
ability to adapt, equal dedication to the three managerial constituencies (customers, employees, and 
stockholders), and commitment to leadership development. Companies with corporate culture that 
promote autonomy with responsibility and risk-taking for the benefit of all stakeholders can discover 
new business opportunities and obtain long-term high-performance. 
Section 7. CONCLUSION 
 As the external business environment fluctuate faster and faster, developing and sustaining 
corporate performance has become an important issue. The goal of this literature review was to 
examine and identify the unique differences between Japanese corporate culture and performance 
27 
enhancing corporate culture. The three typical Japanese corporate culture are slow decision-making 
speed, compliance to authority, and risk-adverse. On the other hand, the three-performance enhancing 
corporate culture are adaptability, dedication to the three managerial constituencies (customers, 
employees, and stockholders), and commitment to leadership development. The reviewed literature 
suggests that for companies to sustain competitive edge, they must become more open to change as 
well as internal business proposals from any employee. Japanese companies, however, are typically 
more risk-averse, less willing to change, and compliant to authority. Further studies on the financial 
effects of Japanese companies that attempts to adjust corporate culture by including performance 
enhancing culture can lead to a better understanding of whether the three performance enhancing 
behaviors can be universally applied across all culture.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this chapter is to construct the research methodology, identify the data, and select 
the method of analysis to better understand the financial effects of performance enhancing corporate 
culture when applied to Japanese companies with typical Japanese corporate culture. Established 
researches have confirmed that performance enhancing culture have a positive correlation with 
increased financial performance over time. Indirectly, this research can also explore some of the other 
effects of specific cultures within the confirmed performance enhancing culture. 
Based on public information and announcements of intention to change their individual 
corporate culture by implementing performance enhancing cultures, Japanese companies had been 
selected for a mix of case studies and qualitative research. Revenue, net income, stock price, and 
employee number of each company had been selected for average growth analysis over a period of 
seven years to observe the changes in company performance compared to the seven years before the 
cultural change implementation respectively. With this approach, researchers can better understand 
the effects of performance enhancing corporate culture on cross-national situations.  
Section 1. COMPANY SELECTION CRITERIA 
 All of the selected companies satisfied the following criterias: all were publicly traded 
Japanese companies that had announced and implemented a corporate culture shift from a more typical 
Japanese one towards a more performance enhancing one, satisfying at least two of the identified 
corporate culture from both sides (see Figure 1 below). The mechanisms to support the shift included 
new human resources training programs, firm wide mandates, diversity promotion teams, corporate 
philosophy amendments…etc. The selected firms also must have had filed financial reports and data 
for more than fourteen years, seven years before and after the cultural shift implementation.  
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Figure 1 : Typical Japanese Corporate Culture vs Performance Enhancing Culture 
 
Note. Result of literature review 
Section 2. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 In millions of yen (¥), numbers from financial statements of three Japanese companies were 
analyzed with year to year growth rate over a fourteen-year period, plus and minus seven years based 
on the performance enhancing corporate culture implementation year. The analysis focused on the 
following performance metrics: Revenue growth, stock price growth, and net-income growth rate. 
These metrics were selected to fairly gauge the company performance in different aspects related to 
corporate culture change: revenue to look at the company’s ability to expand business and grow sales, 
stock price to look at public confidence in the companies’ strategic direction, and net-income to look 
at expenditure control capability against the revenue. Moreover, employment growth was used to 
examine and look at company attractiveness to minimize rehiring and retraining cost.  
1.2.1. Revenue Growth Rate 
The annual rates were calculated by subtracting the previous fiscal year total revenue from 
the current fiscal year total revenue then all divided by the previous fiscal year total revenue. Finally, 
the seven-year average was taken before and after the performance enhancing culture implementation 
separately to arrive at two average company performance percentages in revenue growth. 
1.2.2. Net-Income Growth Rate 
The annual rates were calculated by subtracting the previous fiscal year total net-income from 
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the seven-year average was taken before and after the performance enhancing culture implementation 
separately to arrive at two average company performance percentages in net income growth. 
1.2.3. Stock price Growth Rate 
Also known as the year to date performance (YTD), the numbers were derived by subtracting 
the day one starting price of the fiscal year from the price on the last day of the fiscal year, then divided 
by the day one price and multiplied by 100 to return the annual growth rate. Finally, the seven-year 
average was taken before and after the performance enhancing culture implementation separately to 
arrive at two average company performance percentages in stock price growth.  
1.2.4. Employment Growth Rate 
The annual rates were calculated by subtracting the previous end of fiscal year total employee 
count from the current end of fiscal year total employee count then all divided by the previous end of 
fiscal year total employee count. Finally, the seven-year average was taken before and after the 
performance enhancing culture implementation separately to arrive at two average company 
performance percentages in employment growth. 
Section 3. SCOPE OF STUDY 
 Even though several potential factors, such as the greater economy performance, foreign and 
local competitor strategies…etc. could affect the results, the cultural and financial metrics were 
selected based on past research done by professor John Kotter of Harvard Business School as well as 
many other researchers in the field of corporate culture effects. Through confirmation of training 
adjustment execution, case studies of work behavior shift, and corporate financial data analysis, the 
research method aimed to reveal the effects of performance enhancing corporate culture on company 
performance.  
The key challenges to this research revolved around proving that at least two of the three 
performance enhancing cultures were implemented by the respective companies. In addition, the study 
was limited by the sample Japanese companies that had gone through performance enhancing 
corporate culture change. Moreover, in order to justify the correlation between the two metrics, the 
research spanned over a period of fourteen years, seven before and after the culture shift, to minimize 
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the effects of anomalies within the data. However, because all the data timeframe included the 
financial crisis in 2008 before the implementation year. As a result, the growth rate comparison of the 
metrics was skewed. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Out of the four-output metrics: revenue, net-income, stock price, and employee number, only 
stock price experienced a significant increase in all three companies (see Table 2 below). Also, two of 
the three companies exhibited an increase in employee number average growth rate after the cultural 
shift. 
Table 2: Seven-Year Average Growth Rate Comparison 
 
Source: Result of research 
Section 1. RAKUTEN, INC. 
 As figure 2 shows, Rakuten’s seven-year average growth rate of revenue post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 16.19% vs. 
44.09%, a -27.9% difference. 
Figure 2 : Rakuten, Inc. Revenue Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2012 
As figure 3 shows, Rakuten’s seven-year average growth rate of net-income post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 33.05% vs. 
175.17%, a -142.12% difference. 
Revenue 44.09% vs 16.19% 2.50% vs -0.23% 5.05% vs 3.28%
Net-Income 175.17% vs 33.05% 16.76% vs 12.14% 3.02% vs -4.00%
Stock Price -1.59% vs 13.05% -3.41% vs 16.60% 1.85% vs 7.37%
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Figure 3 : Rakuten, Inc. Net-Income Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2012 
As figure 4 shows, Rakuten’s seven-year average growth rate of stock price post corporate 
culture shift outperformed the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 13.05% vs. -1.59%, a 
+14.64% difference. 
Figure 4 : Rakuten, Inc. Stock Price Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2012 
As figure 5 shows, Rakuten’s seven-year average growth rate of employee number post 
corporate culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 
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Figure 5 : Rakuten, Inc. Employee Number Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2012 
Section 2. AJINOMOTO CO., INC. 
As figure 6 shows, Ajinomoto’s seven-year average growth rate of revenue post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: -0.23% vs. 2.50%, 
a -2.73% difference. 
Figure 6 : Ajinomoto Co., Inc. Revenue Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 7 shows, Ajinomoto’s seven-year average growth rate of net-income post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 12.14% vs. 
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Figure 7 : Ajinomoto Co., Inc. Net-Income Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 8 shows, Ajinomoto’s seven-year average growth rate of stock price post corporate 
culture shift outperformed the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 16.60% vs. -3.41%, a 
+20.01% difference. 
Figure 8 : Ajinomoto Co., Inc. Stock Price Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 9 shows, Ajinomoto’s seven-year average growth rate of employee number post 
corporate culture shift outperformed the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 3.09% vs. 
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Figure 9 : Ajinomoto Co., Inc. Employee Number Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
Section 3. TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICAL CO. LTD. 
As figure 10 shows, Takeda’s seven-year average growth rate of revenue post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 3.28% vs. 5.05%, 
a -1.77% difference. 
Figure 10 : Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Revenue Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 11 shows, Takeda’s seven-year average growth rate of net-income post corporate 
culture shift failed to outperform the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: -4% vs. 3.02%, 
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Figure 11 : Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Net-Income Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 12 shows, Takeda’s seven-year average growth rate of stock price post corporate 
culture shift outperformed the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 7.37% vs. 1.85%, a 
+5.52% difference. 
Figure 12 : Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Stock Price Performance Over Fourteen Years 
 
Note. Cultural shift year: 2010 
As figure 13 shows, Takeda’s seven-year average growth rate of employee number post 
corporate culture shift outperformed the seven-year average growth rate before the shift: 7.67% vs. 
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Figure 13 : Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Employee Number Performance Over Fourteen Years 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
 The purpose of this qualitative and case-based theory study was to identify the financial 
effects of incorporating performance enhancing culture in Japanese companies. This chapter includes 
both discussion and analysis of the four financial metrics data findings from the three selected 
companies to help answer the follow question: 
(R1): What are the financial effects of Japanese companies that incorporate performance enhancing 
corporate culture? 
 The study and data demonstrate that the effects of performance enhancing corporate culture, 
over a seven-year period, failed to significantly increase the growth rate of revenue and net-income in 
Japanese companies; however, stock price grew in all three cases while employee number grew in two 
of the three companies. The data suggest that while performance enhancing culture failed to spark 
increased growth rate in revenue and net-income, investors favorably perceived the firm’s effort to 
implement change in corporate culture; stock price growth rate, on average, outperformed the seven-
year period beforehand by 11.12%. 
Section 1. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
By examining the yearly revenue, net-income, stock price, and employee number growth rate 
of the three selected companies, Rakuten, Inc., Ajinomoto Co., Inc., and Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd., we see patterns of sporadic acute yearly average growth rate that heavily skews both sets of the 
seven-year average growth rate in all four financial metrics.  
1.1.1. Rakuten, Inc. 
Rakuten, founded in 1997 by Hiroshi Mikitani, announced an initiative dubbed 
“Englishnization” in 2010 to make English the official language within the company by 2012. An 
online marketplace giant that excelled in the “B2B2C” business model, Rakuten at the time became a 
conglomerate with rapid growth in transaction volume and sales through its online channels and 
acquisitions of e-commerce giants across the globe: French online retailer PriceMinister along with 
US based Buy.com. Hiroshi Mikitani, with the English proficiency mandate, aimed to breakdown the 
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underlying power relationships in the Japanese language as well as accelerate information sharing 
between the workers and the world outside of Japan. 
 In phase one of “Englishnization”, Rakuten employees had fifteen months to improve their 
TOEIC proficiency score and reach the target or face demotion; any employee that scored below their 
targeted score was required to take a TOEIC computer adaptive test monthly (Neeley, 2011). In phase 
two, the “Englishnization” initiative group began rolling out events to engage staff in English language 
education from the first quarter of 2011 (Neeley, 2011). By inviting guest lecturers to discuss English, 
the workers learned to be more involved in managing their own learning. In phase three, the initiative 
group leader, Kyle Yee, actively encouraged staff to use their English:  
People need[ed] to be able to communicate their ideas, present the logic of their argument and 
defend an argument. Japanese social dynamics discourage[d] arguments among colleagues, 
so my goal [was] to get people using English to discuss broad questions to which no concrete 
answers exist[ed]. (Neeley, 2011, p. 8) 
As a result, cross border information sharing within the Rakuten Group became easier and made 
Rakuten a more nimble, global player. Neel Grover, CEO of acquired Buy.com, expressed that because 
of “Englishnization,” “[Buy.com] can more easily keep Japan-based executives aware of what is 
happening in the US… firsthand, immediate and detailed knowledge is critical because we will be 
competing against them in many markets around the world” (Neeley, 2011).  
Revenue Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Rakuten’s revenue growth rate over the fourteen-year period, fiscal 
year 2005 exhibited an abnormal 184.80% growth rate. In comparison, FY2006 to 2019 reported on 
average a 18.14% growth rate. Due to this anomaly, the seven-year average rate of pre-implementation 
shot up by 23.45%, from 20.64% to 44.09%. The big disparity was the result of several factors 
including the formation of the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, Rakuten membership unification, and 
Japanese stock market boom from individual investors. 
 Rakuten founded the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles in FY2005, which increased the 
awareness of the brand. At the same time, Rakuten enhanced the user experience through cross-
platform membership and service unification with the Rakuten Super Point loyalty program. These 
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initiatives increased user traffic and transaction volume for the entire internet service segment revenue, 
from ¥32,601M in FY2004 to ¥51,865 in FY2005, a 58.54% difference (see Appendix C for graph of 
user traffic acquisition). Furthermore, with the Japanese stock market boom centered on individual 
investors, the brokerage-related income (commissions) from Rakuten Securities increased 
significantly along with account numbers. The segment along in FY2005 generated ¥26,502M, a 
90.04% increase compared to FY2004’s numbers: ¥13,919M. On top of the securities revenue, 
Rakuten began its credit & payment business that immediately generated ¥47,139M with the incentive 
help from Rakuten Ichiba, the company’s online store. 
 The revenue performance in FY2005 suggests that the young company Rakuten, seven years 
removed from establishment, made use of its culture that matched with the external business 
environment at the time to create business opportunities through its many initiatives. As Kotter & 
Heskett mentioned, young companies that have prevailed and achieved early success often times have 
performance boosting culture tailored to the environment. In Rakuten’s case, the company 
successfully sustained another year of high revenue growth at 56.63% in FY2006 but soon lost the 
spark when revenue growth rate hit 5.25% in FY2007 due to the underperforming securities business. 
Net-Income Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Rakuten’s net-income growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2007 exhibited an abnormal 1,265.58% growth rate. Even though FY2012 reported an even higher 
growth rate of 1,804.39%, the data is not included in either of the sever-year average growth rate; as 
a result, the data is excluded from analysis. In comparison, FY2005 to 2006, and 2008 to 2019 reported 
on average a 143% growth rate. Due to this anomaly, the seven-year average rate of pre-
implementation shot up by 181.74%, from -6.56% to 175.17%. The big disparity was the result of the 
selling of Ctrip.com shares. On the other hand, yearly net-income growth rate took a tumble in FY2008 
with an abnormal -249% growth compared to FY2007 as a result of the 2008 Lehman Shock in 
September. 
Rakuten decided to sell all 20.11% of its shares in Ctrip.com International, Ltd., China’s 
largest online travel agency on August 7th, 2007. The stock, originally purchased for US$109M in 
2004, sold at US$531M (~¥58,760M), a 387.16% gain (So, 2007). At the time, Rakuten actually 
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recorded the worst revenue growth rate, 5.25%, in the fourteen-year period, along with a drop of 99.6% 
in operating income due to the lump-sum provision to the allowance for interest repayment losses 
(Rakuten, Inc., 2008). Cashing in on the Ctrip.com stocks led to the net-income abnormality that 
heavily skewed the pre-implementation average. In FY2008, Rakuten reported the worst net-income 
growth rate in the fourteen-year period as a result of the financial crisis. The security business declined 
by -18.82% as a result of lower stock brokerage revenue and margin financial transactions revenue 
from plummeting prices in every stock market (Rakuten, Inc., 2009). Combine this with the loss on 
valuation of investment securities, the company posted a net-income of -¥54,978M, a drop of -249%. 
 The net-income performance in both FY2007 and FY2008 suggests that Rakuten began to 
forget why they performed well in the first place and over-extended itself into online banking, online 
financial services, and personal investment services. With success in the securities business and credit 
& payment segments in FY2005 and FY2006, the company began pumping resources into both 
department without seeing the bigger picture: the Rakuten card. The credit card incentivized 
consumers to shop on Rakuten Ichiba, the core business of the Rakuten Group, which increased the e-
commerce segment revenue by 69.14% and 68.71% respectively in FY2005 and FY2006. 
Stock Price Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Rakuten’s stock price growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2006 exhibited an abnormal -52.16% decline. In comparison, the rest of the thirteen fiscal year 
reported on average an 8.06% growth. Due to this anomaly, the seven-year average rate of pre-
implementation dropped by -8.43%, from 6.84% to -1.59%. The discrepancy was the result of 
continuous business restructuring in Rakuten KC Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the Rakuten Group. On the 
other hand, stock price growth rate jumped by 130.68% in FY2013 compared to FY2012 as a result 
of the substantial revenue growth in domestic e-commerce. 
 Even though revenue in FY2006 grew by 56.63%, net-income dropped by -86.11% as a result 
of the Act for the Control of Money Lending Business, which strengthened regulation on the credit 
business of Rakuten KC Co., Ltd. (Rakuten, Inc., 2007). Along with selling off the automobile 
insurance business, the subsidiary had to significantly increase its bad debt-related expenses under 
regulation. In FY2013, however, stock price grew by 130.68% compared to FY2012. The 
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extraordinary growth rate helped the post-implementation average increase by 19.60%, from -6.55% 
to 13.05%. Rakuten decided to refocus on its roots and executed multiple initiatives within the e-
commerce and credit card business. By linking customers base between Rakuten Card and Rakuten 
Ichiba, the company delivered excellent revenue growth where e-commerce grew by 10.29% while 
internet finance grew by 28.81%, resulting in a 64.60% growth in net-income. Rakuten Super Sale, 
which offered product discount with extra points and 20x point earning by using the Rakuten Card, 
boosted first time purchaser by 50% year-over-year (see Appendix D for data). Rakuten Card members 
also rose by 54.7% party due to the advertising effect of the baseball championship of the Tohoku 
Rakuten Golden Eagles (Rakuten, Inc., 2014). Lastly, Rakuten Card Co. began offering ¥1M to ¥10M 
loan and financing services to Rakuten Ichiba merchants depending on approval (Rakuten Card Co., 
Ltd., 2013). These initiatives helped the overall performance of the Rakuten Group and helped raise 
the stock price. 
 The stock price performance in FY2006 suggests that Rakuten’s ambition to create a full-
online financial service backfired as the regulations changed along with the business environment. 
The growth trends leading up to the 2008 financial crisis suggest that Rakuten misunderstood the 
reason behind its early success: online shopping and selling made easier and cheaper through the 
Rakuten Card. The performance in the post-implementation FY2013 suggests that the company 
redirected its business focus back to the three managerial constituencies (customers, employees, and 
stockholders). Through the many customer related plans, the core e-commerce and Rakuten Card 
business grew by 19.55%, which led to an impressive net-income growth of 120.99%, from ¥19,413 
to ¥42,900. 
Employee Number Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Rakuten’s employee number growth rate over the fourteen-year 
period, FY2005 exhibited a 287.16% growth rate, from 958 to 3,709 employees. In comparison, the 
rest of the thirteen fiscal year reported on average a 12.60% growth rate. Due to the unusually large 
growth rate, the seven-year average rate of pre-implementation increased by 39.07%, from 13.70% to 
39.07%. The inconsistency was the result of the company launching the credit & payment business 
that led to an additional 2,263 people new hires (Rakuten, Inc., 2006). 
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 Through the mid fiscal year acquisition of Kokunai Shinpan Co., Ltd, Rakuten was able to 
commence the credit card and payment service that managed to deliver ¥47,139M in six months. To 
reiterate the startup culture observation, Rakuten, in FY2005, ran with a set of contemporary 
performance enhancing culture created through its early successes during its eight years of operation. 
The decision to pursue the credit & payment business helped forge the synergy between Rakuten 
Ichiba and online shopping payment options. 
1.1.2. Ajinomoto Co., Inc. 
 Ajinomoto, founded in 1917 by Kikunae Ikeda, revised and established new corporate vision, 
The Ajinomoto Group Way, in 2009 to redirect focus towards new value creation, pioneer spirit, social 
contribution, and people valuation. The “Human Resources Training System” launched a year after in 
2010 to enable employees and managers alike to carry out their duties while achieving the newly 
established Ajinomoto Group Way (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2011). A food processing company focused 
on seasoning, Ajinomoto, at the time, divested unprofitable business abroad to focus on biomedical 
products after a growing pressure from competitors in global markets after establishing manufacturing 
abroad twenty years ago. By redefining the company wide philosophy and incorporating a new human 
resources training program, Ajinomoto aimed to align its global workforce and make them more 
adaptative, more focused on customers as well as employees, and more leadership development 
encouragement. 
Initially implemented only in regional headquarters abroad, the new training system soon 
included Japan office and all upper management in order to promote shared values as expressed in the 
Ajinomoto Group Way (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2011). The training program offered career support 
systems that integrated on-the-job training tailored to each employees’ level of skill development 
(Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2011). With the added leadership training program, managers were given the 
tool to identify and nurture potential candidates for next-generation executives. The program helped 
participants develop their expertise by recognizing the core competencies and skills required of leaders, 
and putting them into practice during work duties (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2011).  
Revenue Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Ajinomoto’s revenue growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
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FY2013 displayed an out of ordinary -15.45% growth rate. In comparison, the thirteen other fiscal 
years reported on average a 2.31% growth rate. Due to this anomaly, the seven-year average rate of 
post-implementation dropped by -2.54%, from 2.31% to -0.23%. The difference was the result of 
several factors including a slow economy and business segment consolidation.  
 Ajinomoto sold Calpis Co., Ltd, the company that manufactured the uncarbonated acidic 
flavor soft drink Calpis, to Asahi in May 2012. With the absence of revenue from Calpis in the third 
and fourth quarter, net-sales dropped by -16.55%. At the same time, the pharmaceutical business 
dropped -28.28% as a result of business consolidation to eliminate the underperforming infusion & 
dialysis products (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2014). Lastly, business tie-ups with other companies selling 
edible oil, coffee products, and other products were reclassified into other business segments to 
streamline the operation (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2014). 
 The revenue performance in FY2013 indicates that the Ajinomoto Group actively cut away 
non-core and/or underperforming businesses. The performance enhancing corporate culture practices 
implemented in FY2010 made management steer away from a ¥900M business and reexamine the 
company’s strengths and priorities: seasonings and frozen foods. The company was able to turnaround 
the negative growth rate with the acquisition of Windsor Quality Holdings, a U.S. frozen food 
manufacturer and distributor, and AGF, a 50-50 joint-venture with Mondelez that manufactured 
powered beverages products including coffee, tea, and cocoa in FY2015 (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2015). 
Overseas segment revenue grew by 41.30%, which increased the total revenue by 17.82%. FY2013, 
in a way, was a necessary action to rip off the bandage for aggressive future revenue growth through 
Ajinomoto’s core competence. 
Net-Income Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Ajinomoto’s net-income growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2008 reported an abnormal -136.23% growth rate. In comparison, the rest of the yearly growth rate 
reported an average of 30.08% growth rate. The big disparity was the direct result of a sharp price 
increase in raw materials as well as goodwill impairment. On the other hand, FY2009 reported a 
262.77% growth rate as a result of strong international sales along with the drop in raw material prices. 
 Due to the nature of the food industry, raw material price volatility can be hard to hedge. Raw 
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material, according to the FAO food price index, jumped by 41.42%, from 130.6 to 184.7 points in 
FY2006 and FY2007 (see Appendix E for more data).The price spike further led to the ¥13,400M 
goodwill impairment of Amoy Food Group, a Hong Kong based company with operation in Asia, 
North America, and Europe, that was acquired back in 2006. In FY2009, however, net-income 
performance bounced back from -¥10,227M to ¥16,464M with the help of outstanding international 
sales from Aji-no-moto seasoning in West Africa and Asia, a 46.20% growth in international revenue. 
On top of a 40.8% operating income growth due to the raw material price drop of -8.88% (Ajinomoto 
Co., Inc., 2010), the company was able to recover from FY2008 even when revenue dropped by -
1.64%.  
 The net-income performance in both FY2008 and FY2009 suggests that Ajinomoto had not 
been adapting to the changing business environment; financial performance greatly depended on the 
raw material pricing which led to extra expenditure in the form of cost of goods sold and goodwill 
impairment. However, the company successfully generated a net-income of ¥41,754M, a 37.35% 
growth, and a revenue of ¥1,197,311, a -0.86% decline, in FY2011 even when the food price index 
reached its highest peak in the fourteen-year research period, 225.1 points (see Appendix E for more 
detail). The data suggests that after the performance enhancing culture implementation year of FY2010, 
the company took up the challenge of global climate change on raw material prices and adapted as 
well as developed innovative ways to reduce waste and increase efficiency of raw material utilization 
(Ajinomoto Co., 2012). 
Stock Price Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Ajinomoto’s stock price growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2008 and FY2014 both showed an abnormal yearly growth rate of -33.56% and 74.82% 
respectively. In comparison, the rest of the thirteen-year excluding FY2008 and FY2014 separately 
reported an average growth rate of 8.50% and 0.75% respectively. Due to the anomalies, the pre-
implementation average rate dropped by -5.02% while the post-implementation average rate increased 
by 67.92%.  
The stock price drop in FY2008 was the byproduct of the goodwill impairment due to the 
high raw material price mentioned above in the net-income growth rate section. In FY2013, however, 
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the acquisition of Windsor Quality Holdings on November 5th, 2014 for ¥84,000M, as well as the 
appointment of a new CEO helped raise the stock value by 4.4% and 7.31% respectively. Investors 
saw synergy in the new CEO Takaaki Nishii, the US frozen food giant acquisition, and the AGF 
outstanding shares acquisition. 
Employee Number Growth Rate 
Looking at the results of Ajinomoto’s employee number growth rate over the fourteen-year 
period, FY2006 exhibited a growth rate decline of -5.05%, from 26,409 to 24,733 employees. In 
comparison, the rest of the thirteen fiscal year reported on average a 2.94% growth rate. Due to the 
anomaly, the pre-implementation seven-year average rate dropped by -1.11%, from 2.73% to 1.61%. 
The sudden decline in employee number came as the consequence of price drop in feed grade amino 
acids (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2007). Even though revenue in the segment went up by 4.67%, 1,695 
employees had to be cut to maintain a positive 0.1% grow rate in gross margin due to the higher energy 
and raw material cost as well as the lower pricing due to aggressive competition (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 
2007). 
On the other hand, FY2014 growth rate increased by 13.54%, from 27,579 to 31,312 
employees. In comparison, the rest of the thirteen fiscal year reported on average a 1.62% growth rate. 
Due to the anomaly, the post-implementation seven-year average rate increased by 1.74%, from 1.35% 
to 3.09%. The discrepancy was caused by the Windsor Holdings acquisition in November 2014, which 
led to an additional 1,603 employee, a 31% increase, in the domestic food products segment that 
included frozen food products (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2015). The acquisition also led to more revenue 
as well as more employee, from 12,678 to 14,513, a 14.47% increase, in the International Food 
products segment alone (Ajinomoto Co., Inc., 2015). 
The employee number performance in both FY2006 and FY2014 suggests that Ajinomoto, 
by implementing the performance enhancing corporate culture in FY2010, have become more aware 
of the financial effects of volatile raw material price along with noncore businesses. The company 
seems to have become more adaptable after FY2010 by strengthening one of its core businesses, frozen 
products, through mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, the data suggests that the company has 
started focusing less on the life support segment due to the changing feed grade amino acids market 
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with the reduction of employee by -28.99%, from 6,964 in FY2006 to 4,945 in FY2014. 
1.1.3. Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited 
 Takeda, founded in 1781 by Chobei Takeda I, introduced Diversity as one of the Takeda 
Values in fiscal 2010 to make the corporate culture more outward-looking under the leadership of 
CEO Yasuchika Hasegawa. The largest pharmaceutical company in Asia that thrived with medicines 
in the area of metabolic disorders, neurology, inflammation, gastroenterology, and oncology, Takeda 
had acquired several foreign based companies like the San Diego based Syrrx at the time. Hasegawa, 
by adding more focus on fostering a diverse workforce, aimed to solve the management challenge of 
identifying and training employees that can lead Takeda globally. 
By adding Diversity into the Takeda values, Toyoji Yoshida, Chief Administration Officer at 
the time, believed that 
The employees [had] dramatically changed their attitudes, realizing that they can learn much 
more from communicating with people with different ideas and experiences…At the same 
time, we improve[d] the work-life balance to foster a corporate culture and working 
environment where employees can thrive as our organization [became] more diverse. (Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2011, p. 13) 
The company also established a Cross-Functional Diversity team that met regularly to share and 
reapply best practices in all departments with diversity in mind (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 
2011). Furthermore in 2010, the Center for Learning and Innovation (CLI) was established in Osaka 
to offer a range of training programs to nurture everyone from global leaders to new recruits (Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2011). 
Revenue Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Takeda’s revenue growth rate over the fourteen-year period, FY2008 
exhibited an abnormal 11.90% annual growth rate. In comparison, the other thirteen fiscal years 
reported on average a 3.09% growth rate. Due to this irregularity, the seven-year pre-implementation 
average rate increased by 1.70%, from 3.35% to 5.05%. The difference was the result of two factors: 
dissolving the TAP joint-venture to acquire three additional drugs and acquiring Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. On the other hand, FY2009 reported an abnormal -4.7% decline. In comparison, 
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the other thirteen fiscal years reported on average a 4.27% growth rate. The difference was the result 
of revenue decline in North America due to patent expiration of Prevacid, a drug used to treat and 
prevent stomach and intestinal ulcers. In addition, Takeda’s Japanese over the counter (OTC) drug 
market also took a hit due to the revisions of the Japanese Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. 
 TAP Pharmaceuticals, a joint-venture established with Abbot Laboratories in 1985, 
underwent dissolution to consolidate and streamline R&D expenses and sales & administrative 
expenses while allowing Takeda to acquire TAP products Prevacid, Kapidex, and Uloric (Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2009). This move improved the sales team and product portfolio of Takeda 
Pharmaceutical North America. On top of this, Takeda also acquired Millennium Pharmaceuticals in 
May 2008 for the patents of VELCADE, an anti-cancer drug approved by FDA in June 2008 for use 
on previously untreated patients with multiple myeloma treatment. After the acquisition, the drug 
alone in the USA generated USD $375M (¥40,724M) from June to March FY2008, a 41% jump 
compared to Millennium’s last year numbers (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2009). With the 
inclusion of the new drugs, international sales, mainly in the U.S.A., grew by 22.71%, from 
¥680,560M to ¥835,101. However, in FY2009, Prevacid lost its patent that led to a sales decline of -
11.1% in the North American market (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2009). During the fiscal year, 
the significant appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar, from ¥99.94 to ¥93.28 to $1, a -6.66% 
difference, also caused a reduction in realized Japanese yen revenue. Furthermore, sales dropped by -
9.54% in the consumer healthcare business because of the change in Japanese law on Class 1 OTC 
drugs. This adjustment made the majority of Takeda’s OTC drugs available only through pharmacists 
(Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2010). The OTC drugs became harder for consumers to buy. 
 The revenue performance in both FY2008 and FY2009 shows that Takeda, during the pre-
implementation stage, focused on mergers and acquisitions to expand market share and increase 
revenue on the short-term. This is the result of Takeda failing to produce blockbuster drugs earning 
sales of more than 100 billion yen to offset the drain from expiring patents (Toda, 2017). Business 
shifted from a 50-50 split in FY2010 to a 30-70 domestic Japan and international markets split in 
FY2017; the performance enhancing corporate culture implementation in FY2010 seems to have been 
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born out of necessity to attract talents from all over the world due to the changing pharmaceutical 
industry landscape. The newly appointed CEO in 2015, Christophe Weber, consolidated R&D into 
U.S. and Japan and sent roughly 100 young Japanese researchers to the Takeda labs in Boston, the city 
hub for drug startups, to shake things up (Toda, 2017). 
Net-Income Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Takeda’s net-income growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2014 reported an extraordinary -230.56% annual growth rate. In comparison, the rest of the yearly 
growth rate reported an average of 14.78%. Due to this anomaly, the post-implementation seven-year 
average dropped by -29.75%, from 33.76% to -4%. The big disparity was the direct result of a class 
lawsuit from U.S. consumers on the drug Actos. On the other hand, FY2015 reported a growth rate of 
158.36%; this was more of a return to normal after putting away settlement expense for the lawsuit. 
  Patented in 1985 and marketed in 1999, Actos, a drug used to lower blood sugar in type 2 
diabetics, came under scrutiny when a class action lawsuit in the U.S. sued Takeda and its U.S. partner 
Eli Lilly for failing to change the warning label before FDA issued the warning on the increased 
patient’s risk of developing bladder cancer with prolonged usage in 2011. The FDA, in 2011, 
acknowledged and asked Takeda to add a warning to the drug’s label highlighting an increased risk of 
bladder cancer for Actos users who use the drug for more than one year (Hoff, 2019). Takeda and Eli 
Lilly lost the case and agreed to pay $2.4 billion, on top of a fine of $27.6M, in settlement to settle 
more than 9,000 Actos lawsuits (Hoff, 2019). As a result, Takeda inked a $2.7 billion (¥324,100M) 
provision for expenses related to the Actos litigation in the U.S which led to a net-income of -
¥143,034M even though revenue grew by ¥86,139, 5.09% compared to FY2013. In FY2015, Takeda 
was able to recover as a result of cutting R&D expenses by -9.47%, growing revenue by 1.66%, and 
lowering amortization of goodwill by -29.06% while avoiding another unexpected litigation (Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2016). 
 The net-income performance in both FY2014 and FY2015 shows that Takeda had been 
struggling with adopting to the culture that promotes change. The lawsuit demonstrates that Takeda 
still operated with a culture that discouraged employees from speaking openly to identify problems; 
as a result, the company lost a big fortune. Net-income declined year-to-year over the fourteen-year 
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period, from a seven-year average of ¥299,906M to ¥89,583M. In FY2017, however, net-income 
reported a 61.63% growth, from ¥115,513M to ¥186,708M. This was mainly due to less amortization 
and impairment losses on intangible assets, not operation. Goodwill decreased by ¥34,600M, a -22.1% 
drop compared to FY2016 because of revenue generation reevaluation of the two acquisitions: ARIAD 
and COLCRYS (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 2018).  
Stock Price Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Takeda’s stock price growth rate over the fourteen-year period, 
FY2007 exhibited an abnormal -34.69% decline. In comparison, the rest of the thirteen fiscal year 
reported an average of 6.63%. Due to this anomaly, the seven-year pre-implementation average rate 
dropped by -4.96%, from 6.81% to 1.85%. The anomaly was the result of two events: a lawsuit that 
found Takeda guilty of advertisement abuse and a warning label change requirement by the FDA. On 
the other hand, stock price grow rate jumped by 39.92% in FY2012 as a result of several events 
including then CEO Hasegawa talking about Takeda working to become more global and Takeda 
securing exclusive rights to a new drug targeted for the elderly. 
  Even though Takeda performed well in both revenue and net-income growth, 5.34% and 
5.85% respectively, stock price growth rate declined considerably because of a lawsuit and a 
regulation change in FY2007. On October 28th, Takeda was found guilty for abusing advertising laws 
in a television campaign for its insomnia drug marketed as Rozerem in the U.S. The advertisement, 
targeting parents, used images of schoolchildren, blackboards, schoolbooks, and a school bus that, 
FDA determined, suggested Rozerem is indicated for and could be safely used in the pediatric 
population (Burke, 2007). As a result, stock price dropped by -12.41% on October 30th. The second 
biggest stock price drop during the fiscal year, -6.23% on August 17th, came when the FDA asked 
companies, including Takeda, to add a black box warning label that notifies the risk of heart failure 
on the drugs for treating diabetes 2 on August 14th (Hitti, 2007). This included Takeda’s flagship drug 
Actos. 
 Takeda experienced a tremendous stock price growth in FY2012 with the help of performance 
enhancing corporate culture implementation, exclusive license agreement, and good performance in 
net-income, 21.37% growth compared to the year before. On February 5th, 2013, CEO Hasegawa gave 
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an interview that highlighted his reforms to change Takeda’s corporate culture in order to become a 
globalized company since the domestic Japan market only represents 35% of the business (Jack, 2013). 
This article led to the biggest stock price growth of the year that came on February 6th at 3.63%. The 
second biggest growth, 3.14%, came on January 11th when Takeda announced that it had secured 
license and supply agreement with exclusive development and marketing rights to Norwegian Pronova 
Biopharma’s drug, Lotriga, that provided a new treatment option for patients with too many lipids in 
their bloodstream (thepharmaletter, 2013).  
 The stock price performance in FY2007 and FY2012 suggests that Takeda’s strategies to 
focus more on international markets post-implementation year resonated with investors as well as 
helped the company perform better financially. The company, under the direction of Hasegawa from 
2009 to 2015, rapidly acquired foreign companies to speed up the needed corporate culture change in 
order to become more adaptable and out-ward looking. With the seven-year average stock price growth 
rate rising from 1.85% to 7.37%, investors were confident with the direction even with the massive 
settlement expenses in FY2014.  
Employee Number Growth Rate 
 Looking at the results of Takeda’s employee number growth rate over the fourteen-year 
period, FY2011 growth rate went up by 63.83%, from 18,498 to 30,305 employees. In comparison, 
the rest of the thirteen fiscal year reported an average of 1.18% growth rate. Due to the anomaly, the 
post-implementation seven-year average rate increased by 9.12%, from -1.45% to 7.67%. The sudden 
increase in employee number came as the consequence of the acquisition of Nycomed, a Zurich-
headquartered pharmaceutical company with strong base of operations across Europe and emerging 
markets. With the acquisition, Takeda hoped to prepare itself for the future by shifting business to 
emerging markets since the company estimated they would account for some 40% of the global 
economy while generating about 70% of pharmaceutical market growth (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd., 2012). Takeda ended up keeping every employee, about 12,000, at Nycomed, excluding the US 
dermatology business that was not acquired. 
On the other hand, FY2017 reported a decrease of -8.93%, from 29,900 to 27,230 employees, 
mainly due to Takeda selling off non-core business while combining healthcare into pharmaceutical 
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medicine. The restructuring helped increased net-income by 61.63% while also growing revenue by 
2.22%. Due to the anomaly, the post-implementation seven-year average rate dropped by 2.77%, from 
10.43% to 7.67%. 
The employee number performance in both FY2011 and FY2017 suggests that Takeda, by 
implementing the performance enhancing corporate culture in FY2010, had become more aware of 
the changing landscape of the pharmaceutical industry: the potential for high growth in international 
and emerging markets. The company seemed to have become more adaptable after FY2010 by 
acquiring Nycomed and cutting away non-core businesses. Furthermore, the data suggests that the 
company had started focusing less on the consumer healthcare (OTC) segment due to the competitive 
nature as well as the manufacturing of reagents, clinical diagnostics, and chemical products with a -
51.6% decline in employee number in these segments. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 
 Performance enhancing corporate culture can sustain long-term financial growth because they 
promote a working environment that values challenging the status quo, working for the employee, 
customers, and stockholders while offering opportunities to practice leadership. However, the research 
suggests that Japanese companies with Japanese corporate culture failed to significantly increase 
revenue, net-income, and employee number but succeed in increasing stock price growth rate over a 
seven-year period after adapting performance enhancing corporate culture. The results suggest that by 
attempting to incorporate new culture that encourages versatility and leadership opportunities, 
companies can generate higher stock demand that leads to higher stock price growth rate.  
The paper further suggests that Japanese companies with Japanese corporate culture may 
require a longer period to adapt and materialize the financial benefit of performance enhancing 
corporate culture because of the stark contrast between the two culture in areas such as attitude towards 
authority. Most of the past corporate culture researches had been conducted in Western countries such 
as the U.S. and the United Kingdom, where the population is more diverse in culture and people in 
comparison to Japan, the most ethnically homogenous nation in the world (Das, 2013). Japanese labor 
workforce, who grew up in a society that encourages group affiliation, harmony, compliance to 
authority, hierarchical distinction, and risk-aversive behavior, seems to need to overhaul their national 
cultural tendencies to embrace the new culture that encourages adaptability, equal focus on customers, 
employees, stockholders, and leadership development. Japanese workers may need more practice to 
ask for clarification on decisions made by their bosses because the action of questioning someone 
higher on the social status comes out as rude in Japan; the boss may loss face in the process. The 
Japanese language itself also reinforces obedience to authority in the vertical social scale through the 
honorific forms (sonkeigo, kenjōgo, teineigo). 
Companies must prepare themselves for change as globalization enables more cross-industry 
and cross-national competition. Japanese companies, often stereotyped as innovative but conservative 
giants, needs to reexamine their strategies and look outward to keep up with the constantly evolving 
business world. Japan can no longer expect to succeed abroad through only one way of interpretation; 
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companies must make decisions with input from a pool of diverse people that can offer different point 
of views based on their experience. The research suggests that though performance enhancing 
corporate culture generally failed to create financial benefits for Japanese companies in seven-years, 
the companies, upon closer examination, made decisions to focus more on the external environment 
and prepare for global competition as a result. 
Why should companies adapt performance enhancing culture when the shift may create 
discontent while disrupting the dynamic within the corporation? Adapting performance enhancing 
corporate culture can be challenging and time-consuming but it is a necessity because one thing is for 
certain, change is coming whether people like it or not. Start the process early and one day, the 
company can navigate through any storm. 
Section 1. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 The study has four major limitations: small sample case size, lack of interviews with relevant 
companies, lack of employee turnover data, and short data range. The research only examined three 
companies, as opposed to the 207 companies done by Kotter & Heskett. Though analysis in the 
discussion section were based on public data, the research failed to secure more in-depth understanding 
of how processes and work style changed within the company before and after the implementation 
year; the research did not examine the change in organizational behavior. The analysis also lacked 
insider information on the events that led to the anomalies within the four financial metrics. Moreover, 
the study excluded employee turnover rate due to limited information from public data. As a result, 
the research does not examine the employee perception of the cultural change nor the retention rate.  
Lastly, the case studies only observed fourteen years of data range across the board; however, based 
on past research, large companies generally require ten years to fully incorporate performance 
enhancing culture. 
 Therefore, the findings from this study should be interpreted and applied carefully. The 
financial effect of performance enhancing corporate culture on Japanese companies in a seven-year 
period might not apply to all Japanese companies that adopts the culture. However, even with the 
limitations of the study, the results have provided a fundamental understanding of the difference 
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between performance enhancing culture and Japanese culture, together with the financial effects in 
seven years after implementation. 
Section 2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The study has expanded the body of knowledge regarding the financial effects of cross-
cultural and cross-national application of performance enhancing corporate culture. The findings of 
the study can be applied to further research on Japanese employee behavioral changes during culture 
shift to better understand the effects of performance enhancing culture on employee retention and 
attraction rate. Future research could minimize the limitations by increasing the case samples, 
conducting interviews with multiple departments and levels within the case samples, securing yearly 
employee turnover rate with the case samples, and extending the data range to ten years before and 
after new culture implementation. By minimizing the limitations, the research may shed light on some 
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Length of Major Cultural 
Change Effort 
General Electric Very Lage 10 years and continuing 
ICI   6 years 
Nissan   6 years and continuing 
Xerox   7 years 
Bankers Trust Large 8 years 
First Chicago   10 years 
American Express 
TRS 
  6 years 
British Airways   4 years 
SAS Medium 4 years 
ConAgra   4 years 
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User Traffic Acquisition Over a Three-Year Period 
 



















Rakuten Members Making Purchases for The First-Time Over a One-Year Period 
 



















Food Price Index Change between FY2006-2019 
 
Source: FAO, 2020, http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ 
FY (Mar) Food Price Index Growth Rate
2002 91.1
2003 101.6 11.53%
2004 113.7 11.91%
2005 120.2 5.72%
2006 130.6 8.65%
2007 180.3 38.06%
2008 184.7 2.44%
2009 168.3 -8.88%
2010 202.5 20.32%
2011 225.1 11.16%
2012 212.6 -5.55%
2013 208.6 -1.88%
2014 193.5 -7.24%
2015 157.6 -18.55%
2016 167.5 6.28%
2017 173.9 3.82%
2018 167.2 -3.85%
2019 174.7 4.49%
